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EVIDENTIARY POLICIES THROUGH OTHER MEANS:
THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF “SUBSTANTIVE LAW” ON THE DISTRIBUTION
OF ERRORS AMONG RACIAL GROUPS
Gustavo Ribeiro*
Abstract
This Article develops an analytical framework to investigate novel
ways in which legal reforms disguised as “substantive” can affect
procedural due process safeguards differently among racial groups.
Scholars have long recognized the impact evidence rules have on
substantive policies, such as modifying primary incentives or affecting the
distribution of legal entitlements in society. However, legal scholars have
not paid enough attention to the reverse effect: how changes in
“substantive law” influence policy objectives traditionally associated
with evidence law—“evidentiary policies.”
To fill this gap, this Article discusses three related evidentiary
policies. The first is accuracy, which courts and scholars consider a
central objective of evidence law. But improving the accuracy of legal
fact-finding is not an exclusive function of evidence law. Different
substantive rules and doctrines also influence the accuracy of legal
decisions. Albeit valuable, accuracy is neither free nor cheap. A second
important consideration in evidence law is the cost of litigation—and the
cost of fact-finding in particular. Substantive law also plays a role in
determining the expense of adjudication. Since we cannot eliminate errors
from an adjudicative system with limited resources, we must decide which
errors we are willing to accept and which are worthy of spending more
resources to avoid. The third example of evidentiary policy affected by
substantive law, and the one this Article focuses on, is allocating the risk
of mistaken judgments of fact between parties.
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Standards of proof stand out as a particularly important evidentiary
mechanism to distribute the risk of errors. The final error distribution,
however, is also a function of other factors, such as the accuracy of the
legal fact-finding and how rules are designed and applied. Substantive
rules can alter the error distribution in a myriad of ways. Through graphs
and other analytical tools, this Article develops a framework to identify
and assess these impacts on various situations, including racial
disparities between Black and White defendants.
The effects of substantive law on allocating error risk between
parties raise important concerns for different doctrines, particularly for
procedural due process. Courts have consistently held that procedural
due process requires an error-distribution strongly biased in favor of
criminal defendants. This requirement is primarily enforced through
standards of proof and other evidentiary rules. However, this Article
argues that substantive law changes can move us away from an errordistribution strongly biased in favor of criminal defendants. Scholars and
practitioners often fail to consider these effects when discussing changes
to existing laws. This omission comes at a potentially high cost for
defendants’ procedural due process and other constitutional safeguards,
especially for minority groups.
I. INTRODUCTION
Evidence determines winners and losers in a lawsuit. But the impact of
evidence, and the body of rules governing it, are not limited to the outcome of cases.
Evidence can affect how (or whether) laws are enforced and policies promoted. For
instance, evidentiary rules can alter individuals’ incentives outside the courtroom by
partially determining the expected outcomes of potential lawsuits. Evidence can also
affect the distribution of legal entitlements in society. Policymakers seeking to alter
wealth or income distribution across or within different social groups can use
evidentiary devices to do so.
Much of this is known to legal scholars.1 The relevant literature, however, has
not paid enough attention to the inverse relationship between substantive and
evidence law.2 That is, they have not focused sufficiently on the different ways
1

See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of Evidence
on Primary Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. 518, 528 (2010) (describing how individuals have
an incentive to gather and preserve evidence even when socially wasteful); Robert E. Scott
& George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 825–
34 (2006) (explaining how evidentiary considerations influence contracts even in the absence
of active litigation); Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (2001) (defending the general ban on character evidence based on
the potential effect that admitting the evidence could have on incentivizing criminal acts).
2
Noteworthy exceptions include: Dale A. Nance, Choice of Law for Burdens of Proof,
46 N.C. J. INT’L L. 235 (2021); Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive
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“substantive law” affects policies traditionally associated with evidence law—
“evidentiary policies.”3 This omission comes with potentially high social costs for
defendants’ procedural due process safeguards, particularly for members of minority
groups. This Article fills this gap by developing an analytical framework to assess
how changes in “substantive law” influence evidentiary policies.
The Article focuses on three related evidentiary policies. The first is accuracy,
which courts and scholars consider a central objective of evidence law.4 Improving
the accuracy of legal fact-finding is not an exclusive function of evidence law;
different substantive rules and doctrines also influence the accuracy of legal
decisions. Consider, for instance, the criminalization of perjury.5 Individuals willing
to come forward and testify under oath have an incentive to tell the truth because
they will likely face a sanction if they fail to do so. The expected result is an increase
in truthful testimony—and a corresponding increase in accuracy—in legal
proceedings.6
Albeit valuable, accuracy is neither free nor cheap. The cost of litigation—and
fact-finding, in particular—is also an important consideration in evidence and
Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801 (2010); Bruce L. Ackerman, The Conclusive Presumption
Shuffle, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 761 (1977); Albert Kocourek, Substance and Procedure, 10
FORDHAM L. REV. 157 (1941).
3
The foregoing discussion is not intended to necessarily refute the prevailing postrealist rejection of a sharp substance-procedure distinction. This Article uses the broad
categories of “substantive” and “procedural” primarily as analytical devices. Evidentiary
considerations are already widely discussed in connection with rules traditionally associated
with “procedural law.” Not so much for rules traditionally associated with “substantive law.”
4
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules should be construed so as to administer
every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and . . . promote the
development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just
determination.”) (emphasis added); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (“[W]e
must be mindful [in assessing the interests of the individual and the state] that the function
of legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.”); Tehan v. United States,
382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (“The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth . . . .”);
Michael S. Pardo, Evidence Theory and the NAS Report on Forensic Science, 2010 UTAH L.
REV. 367, 372 (2010) (“Theoretical accounts in the law of evidence . . . aim to either justify
or to reform evidentiary rules or practices in light of their tendencies to produce true
(factually accurate) outcomes or produce false (factually erroneous) outcomes.”); Richard A.
Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 93 VA. L. REV. 1197, 1199
(2007) (“Scholars and policymakers thus overwhelmingly view evidentiary rules in criminal
law as geared primarily toward accuracy in fact-finding.”); Dale A. Nance, Reliability and
the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191, 194 (2003) (“Evidence, or the
rules regulating evidence, may be said to be more or less veritistic, more or less conducive
to accurate verdicts.”); Jeffrey Bellin, The Evidence Rules that Convict the Innocent, 106
CORNELL L. REV. 305, 315 (2021) (“The primary end sought through the evidence rules and
accompanying trial process is factual accuracy.”).
5
See infra Section III.A.
6
See ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 323 (1994) (“False testimony in
a formal proceeding is intolerable. We must neither reward nor condone such a ‘flagrant
affront’ to the truth-seeking function of adversary proceedings.”).
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procedural law.7 Substantive law also plays a role in determining the expense of
adjudication. Copyright law presents two interesting and surprising examples of
substantive rules with important effects on litigation costs.8 For instance, the
eligibility requirements for copyright protection that an author’s work be creative
and fixed in any tangible medium of expression gain special significance when
viewed as mechanisms to reduce litigation costs in copyright cases.9
The prohibitive costs of perfect accuracy mean that we should expect to make
mistakes. Since we cannot eliminate all errors from an adjudicative system with
limited resources, we must decide which errors we are willing to accept and which
are worth spending more resources to avoid. This brings us to another policy goal of
evidence law: the allocation of the risk of errors between parties.10 Standards of
proof stand out as an especially important evidentiary mechanism with this
function.11 For instance, a preponderance of the evidence standard is meant to share
the risk of error between litigants in (almost) equal fashion. Accordingly, it is often
used in cases, such as private monetary disputes, where the dominant belief is that
we should be less concerned about how errors are distributed between parties.12 On
the other hand, in criminal cases, where defendants’ life and liberty are at stake, we
7
FED. R. EVID. 102 recognizes this when it states, in relevant part, that the Federal
Rules of Evidence “should be construed so as to . . . eliminate unjustifiable expense and
delay . . . .” Likewise, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also give voice to that concern
in FED. R. CIV. P. 1, which states, “These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and
proceedings . . . [and] should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the
parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.”
8
See infra Part III.B.
9
Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 687–88
(2003).
10
See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof, 13 LAW, PROB. & RISK 195, 206 (2014);
ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 3–4 (2005); see generally LARRY LAUDAN,
TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY (Gerald Postema
ed., 2006) (discussing error in the law and the distribution of error in relation to rules of
evidence and procedure).
11
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982) (“In any given proceeding, the
minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects . . . a societal
judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.”);
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (“The standard serves to allocate the risk of
error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate
decision.”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369–70 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he
choice of the standard for a particular variety of adjudication does, I think, reflect a very
fundamental assessment of the comparative social costs of erroneous factual
determinations.”). For an in-depth discussion of the error-distribution function of standards
of proof, see generally Gustavo Ribeiro, The Case for Varying Standards of Proof, 56 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 161 (2019).
12
Addington, 441 U.S. at 423 (“Since society has a minimal concern with the outcome
of [monetary disputes between private parties,] plaintiff’s burden of proof is a mere
preponderance of the evidence. The litigants thus share the risk of error in roughly equal
fashion.”).
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resort to a beyond reasonable doubt standard, which is meant to reduce the likelihood
of an erroneous judgment against defendants.13
The final error distribution is also a function of other factors, such as legal factfinding accuracy and how rules are designed and applied. Substantive rules can alter
the error-distribution by changing these factors in a myriad of ways.14 This Article
develops an analytical framework to identify and assess these impacts in a variety
of situations.15 For instance, it shows how legal reforms in “substantive law” that
decrease legal fact-finding accuracy might also result in a corresponding error
distribution that is less protective of defendants.
The Article also discusses the disparate racial impacts that reforms in
“substantive law” can have on Black and White defendants.16 The Article uncovers
another form of racial disparity in our legal system seldom discussed by legal
scholarship: because the appearance of guilt is unevenly distributed across races,
White defendants are often afforded a more protective error distribution than Black
defendants. For instance, the Article shows that legal reforms that decrease accuracy
can lead to an error distribution that is less protective of Black defendants but more
protective of White defendants. The effects of substantive law on allocating error
risk between parties raise important concerns for different doctrines, including
procedural due process. The Supreme Court has consistently held that due process
requires an error distribution strongly biased in favor of criminal defendants.17
However, as this Article shows, even small legal changes can move away from that
requirement. Scholars and practitioners often fail to consider these effects when
discussing changes to existing “substantive” laws. This omission comes at a
potentially high cost for defendants’ procedural due process and other constitutional
safeguards, especially for minority groups.
13
Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (“The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the
American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of
convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the
presumption of innocence—that bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose
‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’”) (quoting
Coffin v. United States, 165 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
14
See infra Sections III.C.1, 2.
15
The framework in the Article admittedly is not meant as a full picture of our
adjudicatory institutions. Most noticeably, it does not fully capture the role of implicit and
explicit biases and prejudices against different social groups that permeate our legal system
in general, and the criminal justice system in particular. Also not part of the analysis is the
impact of plea bargaining and settlements in litigation, although they are recognizably large.
These are all important topics for a full picture of our legal system. However, this Article,
by design, focuses on a narrower set of variables to attempt to isolate specific effects.
16
See infra Sections III.C.2, 3.
17
See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (“[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”); Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (“Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless
the Government has borne the burden of producing the evidence and convincing the
factfinder of his guilt.”).
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This Article proceeds in two parts. Part II examines ways to pursue policies
traditionally associated with substantive law using tools from the evidence toolbox.
It focuses on how evidence rules and doctrines can alter incentives outside the
courtroom and the distribution of entitlements in our society. Part III presents the
flip side of the same coin, addressing specific ways substantive law can affect
evidentiary policies, including improving accuracy in legal fact-finding, reducing
litigation costs, and distributing the risk of error between parties. Special attention
is paid to the allocation of the risk of error between parties and racial disparities
between Black and White defendants.
II. PURSUING SUBSTANTIVE POLICIES THROUGH EVIDENTIARY RULES
Evidence law can affect how (or whether) different substantive laws are
enforced and how their underlying policies are promoted.18 Existing research has
explored these effects in connection with expert evidence,19 discovery,20 pleadings,21

18

Main, supra note 2; E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of
Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 325 (1986) (“[P]rocedure and substance cannot be
divorced: no procedural decision can be completely ‘neutral’ in the sense that it does not
affect substance.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 196–
202 (2004).
19
See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Trial Judges—Gatekeepers or Usurpers? Can the
Trial Judge Critically Assess the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without Invading the
Jury’s Province to Evaluate the Credibility and Weight of the Testimony?, 84 MARQ. L. REV.
1 (2000); David S. Caudill & Donald E. Curley, Strategic Idealizations of Science to Oppose
Environmental Regulation: A Case Study of Five TMDL Controversies, 57 U. KAN. L. REV.
251 (2009).
20
See, e.g., R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable
Problem of Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429 (2011); Martin H. Redish &
Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Procedural-Substantive Tension: A
Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 26 (2008); Robert G. Bone, Who
Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961 (2007);
Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform
Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 1167 (2005).
21
See, e.g., Alex Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 1, 2012, at 1; Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A
Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010); Joseph A. Seiner, After
Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179 (2010); A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading
Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2009).
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summary judgment,22 and class actions.23 This Part discusses two policy
considerations traditionally associated with substantive law that we can also pursue
using evidentiary rules: primary behavior and the distribution of legal entitlements.
A. Changing Primary Incentives
Evidentiary rules are important in determining the expected payoffs associated
with available courses of action. Rational individuals behave based on a perceived
incentive structure. These incentives are a function, in part, of the expected value of
liability determinations (i.e., the probability-weighted average of damage awards for
which one may be liable to potential plaintiffs).24
Evidentiary rules affect the expected value of liability determinations in
different ways. For example, individuals have an incentive to generate, gather, and
preserve evidence in their favor.25 A potential wrongdoer in an automobile accident
might conclude she is better off exercising care in a way that allows her to gather
exculpatory evidence and prevent a potential victim from obtaining inculpatory
evidence in a socially cost-effective way.26 She might slow down, brake, signal, or
honk to get the attention of the potential victim or bystanders who could testify in
her favor. If cameras captured her movements, she could offer the recordings in
litigation. Additionally, she might refrain from drinking before driving, in part,
because it might offer strong inculpatory evidence to a potential victim. By using
safety mechanisms and refraining from engaging in risky conduct, the potential

22

See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of
Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39, 66 (2008); Arthur
R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,”
and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 982 (2003).
23
See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Procedure in Eclipse: Group-Based Adjudication in a PostConcepcion Era, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1203 (2012); Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the
Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924 (2006);
Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection
of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71 (2003); Robert G. Bone &
David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251 (2002).
24
See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1477, 1483 (1999).
25
Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 1, at 522. For other seminal discussions of
evidence-production costs as a proxy for the adequacy of the producer’s primary behavior,
see Chris W. Sanchirico, Relying on the Information of Interested—and Potentially
Dishonest—Parties, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 320 (2001); Chris W. Sanchirico, Games,
Information, and Evidence Production: with Application to English Legal History, 2 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 342 (2000); Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An
Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994).
26
For a contrary intuition, see Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 1, at 528 (suggesting
that a potential victim might decide she is better off allowing accidents than avoiding a
collision because it might then be easier for her to prove that the other party was at fault).
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wrongdoer increases her chances of prevailing in case of a dispute arising out of an
accident.
The incentive to gather favorable evidence is widespread, but not always
socially desirable. In medical settings, the need to produce evidence in anticipation
of a malpractice suit might incentivize doctors to request additional exams, require
unnecessary hospitalizations, make redundant referrals, or prescribe unneeded
medications.27 In the criminal world, police officers might have an incentive to allow
individuals to endanger, or even harm, individuals or property to obtain better
inculpatory evidence.28 In other words, rational individuals might decide to act in an
“evidentiarily advantageous” way even when doing so is socially wasteful.29 By
exploring the potential effect of evidentiary law on primary behavior, policymakers
can modify evidentiary rules to achieve specific policy objectives such as increasing
deterrence of harmful activities or reducing the chilling effects of benign activities.30
B. Redistributing Legal Entitlements
We can also use evidence rules to pursue the “substantive” policy of
redistributing legal entitlements.31 Any argument about the social benefits of legal
27

David M. Studdert, Michelle M. Mello, William M. Sage, Catherine M. DesRoches,
Jordan Peugh, Kinga Zapert & Troyen A. Brennan, Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk
Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2612 (2005)
(classifying that type of strategy as “assurance behavior”); see also James Gibson, Doctrinal
Feedback and (Un)Reasonable Care, 94 VA. L. REV. 1641, 1663–64 (2008).
28
Cf. People v. Rizzo, 158 N.E. 888, 889 (N.Y. 1927) (police allowed individuals to
approach and rob victims to produce evidence against them). See also State v. Duke, 709 So.
2d 580, 581–82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that an alleged child molester was
arrested too early to qualify as an attempter); Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 560 N.E.2d 698, 703
(Mass. 1990) (holding that riding in a car with a loaded gun in an unsuccessful search for the
intended victim was insufficient to support a conviction for attempted assault and battery);
People v. Coleman, 86 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Mich. 1957) (holding that “the purchase of a
hunting rifle, secretly intended for the murder of the neighbor” is “merely an act of
[noncriminal] preparation”).
29
One way to mitigate this perverse incentive is through doctrines such as comparative
negligence and duty to mitigate. But these options also carry problems as they dilute
deterrence incentives on potential wrongdoers as they would no longer be fully liable for the
harm they produce. Also, enforcement might be costly as courts might have to engage with
elaborate counterfactuals.
30
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738, 738 (2012) [hereinafter
Kaplow, Burden of Proof] (highlighting a tradeoff between the benefits of deterrence and the
costs of chilling beneficial conduct that go into setting burdens of proof in adjudication to
maximize social welfare).
31
Distributive analyses are almost always controversial. Perhaps for that reason,
distributive considerations are often dealt with indirectly, such as under the guise of formal
legal equality or equality of bargaining power. Noteworthy exceptions include Daniel
Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There Be?, 112 YALE L.J. 2291, 2293 (2003)
(developing a new account of egalitarianism based on a new conception of

2021]

EVIDENTIARY POLICIES THROUGH OTHER MEANS

449

changes depends on specific assumptions about the distribution of legal
entitlements.32 By manipulating entitlements, we can significantly influence (or
potentially dominate) the cost-benefit analysis of any legal change.33
Evidence rules are a part of individuals’ legal entitlements with relevant
consequences to the societal distribution of wealth and income.34 It follows that
anyone interested in altering the distribution of wealth or income among different
social groups can also use rules of evidence and procedure to reach redistributive
objectives. For instance, there are historical examples of changes in “mere”
evidentiary and other procedural rules that have weakened civil rights.35 Recent
nonsubordination); LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 28–38
(2002) (providing an in-depth criticism of the role of distributive considerations in the
assessment of legal policies); Carlos A. Ball, Autonomy, Justice, and Disability, 47 UCLA
L. REV. 599, 617–18 (2000) (considering distribution implications of rights and benefits
awarded to people with disabilities); RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 307–19 (2000)
(concerning health care policy); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking CostBenefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 245 (1999) (concerning administrative practice);
Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283,
322 (1994) (asserting that the common thread within estate tax concerns distribution);
Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 387, 433–38, 444 (1981) (outlining the interplay between the distribution of wealth and
policy makers’ decisions in creating private law rules); see generally Duncan Kennedy,
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special References to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982) (arguing
that distributive and paternalist motives play a central role in explaining contract and tort
rules with respect to agreements).
32
The notion of a “legal entitlement” is a broad one, encompassing different forms of
“rights,” such as the right to one’s bank deposits, the right to a clean atmosphere, the right
of free assembly, or the right to drive others out of business by free competition, etc. See
generally Ian Ayres & J. M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 (1996) (discussing different ways that
policymakers can protect legal entitlements); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1089 (1972) (distinguishing between property rules and liability rules as techniques for
protecting entitlements). Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld provides a seminal classification of
legal entitlements in his works. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913)
(categorizing different legal entitlements into fundamental elements of legal relations).
33
The exact impact of any change in the legal entitlements will depend on several
variables, such as the price and income elasticities of supply and demand curves, the presence
of externalities, and the competitive structure of that specific market.
34
See generally Tamar Frankel, Presumptive Reasoning Applied to Legal Doctrine:
Presumptions and Burdens of Proof as Tools for Legal Stability and Change, 17 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 759 (1994) (providing a discussion of the centrality of burdens of proof for
individuals’ entitlements).
35
See, e.g., Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Judith Olans Brown & Stephen N. Subrin,
Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law
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examples include Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.36 In Wal-Mart, the court
effectively raised the plaintiffs’ burden to meet the commonality requirement for
class certification. The court suggested that plaintiffs needed to show evidence that
the defendant had an explicit policy of gender discrimination or an identifiable
discriminatory practice, like a testing requirement.37 As a result, discrimination and
equal pay cases are considerably more challenging to win.38 In other words, workers’
legal entitlements are weakened compared to those of large employers.
Research has also explored the distributive consequences of other procedural
rules, such as the stricter pleading requirements following the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly39 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.40 For instance,
dismissals of employment discrimination and civil rights cases have risen
significantly in the wake of Iqbal, particularly in cases involving individuals as
plaintiffs as opposed to corporate and governmental entities.41 In employment
discrimination and civil rights, the information needed to establish the plaintiff’s
case is often in the defendant’s hands.42 Because these plaintiffs tend to have limited
in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REV. 211, 301 (1992); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing
Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and
Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 520 (2010); see also McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 n.18 (1973) (creating the so-called disparate
treatment theory, which requires plaintiffs to prove defendants’ subjective discriminatory
intent, and not merely the consequences, as was the rule before under Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971)); Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (establishing that plaintiffs need proof of discriminatory motive
in disparate treatment cases).
36
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
37
Id. at 355–57.
38
Elizabeth Schneider & Nancy Gertner, “Only Procedural”: Thoughts on the
Substantive Law Dimensions of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 57 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 767, 771 (2013).
39
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
40
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009).
41
See generally Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading,
101 VA. L. REV. 2117 (2015) (showing that dismissals of employment discrimination and
civil rights cases have risen significantly in the wake of Iqbal); Raymond H. Brescia, The
Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing
Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235 (2011) (reporting that dismissal rates in housing
and employment discrimination cases increased after Iqbal, but not after Twombly); Patricia
W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM.
U. L. REV. 553 (2010) (estimating that motions to dismiss were four times more likely to be
granted after Iqbal as they were before, even after controlling for other variables); but see
generally William H. J. Hubbard, Testing for Change in Procedural Standards, with
Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (2013) (Twombly
precipitated no significant change in dismissal rates).
42
See, e.g., David A. Green, The Fallacy of Liberal Discovery: Litigating Employment
Discrimination Cases in the E-Discovery Age, 44 CAP. U. L. REV. 693, 721 (2016); Terri L.
Dill, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: Refining the Burdens of Proof in Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 48 ARK. L. REV. 617, 617 (1995).
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resources and limited access to evidence, they are usually less able to put forward
the necessary factual allegations to survive dismissal.
Upon reflection, it is no surprise that evidentiary rules can influence
“substantive” policies. Many substantive rules are partially justified only with
reference to a particular evidentiary background.43 Take, for instance, the statute of
frauds requirement in some States that an agreement above a certain value must be
in writing to be enforceable.44 This requirement makes sense in an evidentiary
system where we doubt our ability to verify correctly the authenticity of oral
agreements. In a legal system where evidence of oral agreement is more readily
available and carries greater weight, we may have no prevailing reason not to
enforce those agreements. If a change in the evidentiary background provides a good
reason to modify a substantive rule, then part of the justification for that rule is
procedural.
The dependency of substantive rules on evidence goes deeper. All substantive
law operates within a specific evidentiary apparatus. Imagine an evidentiary system
with high standards of proof for all types of claims and causes of action. We should
expect that substantive laws would be enacted considering that evidentiary reality.
If some of these laws were enforced in a different evidentiary system, with
significantly lower standards of proof, we would expect these rules to be overenforced. Similarly, substantive laws drafted within an evidentiary system with low
discovery costs would be under-enforced if translated to a system with high
discovery costs. Substantive laws are not written in an evidentiary vacuum.
Evidentiary systems, in turn, are not fungible.45 That would be the case only if the
same set of substantive rules could be equally enforced in any evidentiary system.
But that is rarely so.
III. PURSUING EVIDENTIARY POLICIES THROUGH SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Legal scholarship has not paid enough attention to the different ways
substantive law affects policies traditionally associated with evidence law—
“evidentiary policies.” To help fill that void, this Part discusses three examples of
evidentiary policies, namely accuracy, litigation costs, and the distribution of the
risk of error, and examines how they are shaped by substantive law.
43

See references supra note 2.
D. Michael Risinger, “Substance” and “Procedure” Revisited: With Some
Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of “Irrebuttable Presumptions,” 30 UCLA L.
REV. 189, 206 (1982).
45
Main, supra note 2, at 827; see also Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some
Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L. J. 718, 737 (1975); Paul D. Carrington,
Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of
Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2070 (1989);
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2247 (1989); Stephen C. Yeazell, The
Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 641–46
(1994).
44
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A. Improving Accuracy
Accuracy is a central objective of evidence law.46 The Federal Rules of
Evidence explicitly recognize: “[t]hese rules should be construed . . . to the end of
ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”47 The Supreme Court
supported this view when it claimed that the “basic purpose of a trial is determining
truth.”48 This position is also deeply embedded in the history of the field.49 With the
goal of improving accuracy in mind, we can better understand the justification
behind many evidence rules and doctrines.
Exclusionary rules provide an interesting example. At first, excluding any
evidence from a trial might seem to interfere with the accuracy of the legal system.
This apparent contradiction has led many prominent authors to argue against
withholding non-misleading evidence from fact-finders.50 Yet, in exceptional
situations, evidence may fatally undermine the pursuit of accuracy. For example, a
confession made by means of torture or coercion might reduce accuracy as research
has consistently shown that individuals often confess to crimes they did not commit
to stop the torture.51 The ban on hearsay is another good illustration. From the factfinder’s perspective, it is generally preferable to hear and confront the original
declarant of an out-of-court statement. However, the parties have an incentive to
46

See sources cited supra note 4.
FED. R. EVID. 102 (emphasis added).
48
Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
49
See William Twining, Evidence and Legal Theory, 47 MOD. L. REV. 261, 272 (1984)
(“There is undoubtedly a dominant underlying theory of evidence in adjudication in which
the central notions are truth, reason and justice under the law. It can be re-stated simply in
some such terms as these: the primary end of adjudication is rectitude of decision, that is the
correct application of rules of substantive law to facts that have been proved to an agreed
standard of truth or probability.”); compare Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An
Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975) (arguing against the adversarial process as
a truth-seeking enterprise) with Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel’s Search for Truth, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 1060 (1975) (replying that the adversary process is necessary to preserve for
individual dignity); and H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and Judicial Hackles:
A Reaction to Judge Frankel’s Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067 (1975) (proposing reforms to
the adversary process to strengthen its truth-seeking goal).
50
See, e.g., 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, SPECIALLY
APPLIED TO ENGLISH PRACTICE 302–12, 350–58 (1827); JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 265 (1898); JOHN WIGMORE,
A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
414 (1940). For more recent works, see ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL
WORLD 292–95 (1999); LAUDAN, supra note 10, at 121–22; Susan Haack, Epistemology
Legalized: Or, Truth, Justice, and the American Way, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 43, 56 (2004); but see
Frederick Schauer, In Defense of Rule-Based Evidence Law—and Epistemology Too, 5
EPISTEME 295, 303 (2008) (“[E]xclusionary rules . . . produce the largest number or higher
percentage of a good decision and the smallest number or lowest percentage of bad ones.”).
51
See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 15–16
(1978).
47
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present only those statements that advance their case and reduce the chance of a
damaging cross-examination. Banning hearsay gives parties an incentive to bring
the declarant into the court.52
The epistemic function of some exclusionary rules acquires additional meaning
within the American institutional background.53 In an adversarial system where
parties control what evidence will be brought to court, we should expect selfinterested parties to present evidence of inferior evidentiary value, even when better
evidence (from the fact-finder’s standpoint) is available. In this scenario,
exclusionary rules are a useful instrument in motivating the parties to present the
best available evidence. Accuracy is also a justification for part of that institutional
background itself. One widely accepted justification for the adversarial system is
that the parties’ self-interest provides them with enough incentive to investigate and
put forward their best case. The trier of fact remains relatively detached from the
evidence and, presumably, best able to discern the truth.54
Albeit ubiquitously recognized, the value of more accurate decisions is mostly
taken for granted. Rarely do we ask why accuracy is desirable in the first place. A
seemingly straightforward answer is that innocent individuals have a right not to be

52

Not all exclusionary rules have accuracy as their underlying justification. For
instance, the privilege between spouses, doctor and patient, and attorney and client are
justified on other grounds. See, e.g., Hock Lai Ho, The Fair Trial Rationale for Excluding
Wrongfully Obtained Evidence, in DO EXCLUSIONARY RULES ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL? 283
(Sabine Gless & Thomas Richter eds., 2019) (discussing how trial fairness is undermined by
allowing reliance on wrongfully obtained evidence); Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed
Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 167 (2006) (“Privileges, for
example, do not purport to serve epistemic goals.”); Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical
Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 420 (1991) (“Most privilege rules are designed to sacrifice
truth-seeking to other values, and thus they are indifferent to the comparison of the
conventional view of the proof rules and the equally well specified cases proposal.”).
53
See generally MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT (1997) (examining how
the American legal system affects the way evidence is presented in court); Robert M. Bloom
& David H. Fentin, “A More Majestic Conception”: The Importance of Judicial Integrity in
Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47 (2010) (summarizing the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning exclusionary rules between its inception and its
incorporation to the states); Mark S. Brodin, The British Experience with Hearsay Reform:
A Cautionary Tale, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1417 (2016) (telling a cautionary tale of the
negative consequences that followed when the U.K. relaxed its requirements of crossexamination).
54
See Mirjan Damaška, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 1083, 1092 (1975); DAMAŠKA, supra note 53, at 74–79. The argument has a
similar structure to Mill’s argument for freedom of speech in JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY (1859). But see generally Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L.
REV. 227 (1988) (arguing that a best evidence principle in the adversary system does not
guarantee that the best reasonably available evidence on an issue will be introduced by the
parties).
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mistakenly convicted of crimes or found liable for damages.55 Less obviously,
perhaps, accuracy is also valuable to improve individuals’ incentives to behave
appropriately by increasing deterrence and decreasing chilling costs.56
Accuracy is not only a goal, nor solely a function of, evidentiary laws.
Substantive law also influences the accuracy of legal fact-finding. We can better
explain and understand different rules and doctrines traditionally associated with
substantive law as also having the purpose, or at least the effect, of increasing the
accuracy of the legal system. One example is perjury.57 Because most cases rely
upon sworn testimony, our court system’s integrity depends in large part on the
truthfulness of statements made under oath.58 Once lying under oath is criminalized,
individuals willing to come forward and testify under oath have an incentive to tell
the truth because if they fail to do so, they will likely face a sanction. The expected
result is an increase in truthful testimony and a corresponding increase in accuracy
within legal proceedings.

55

This raises the interesting question: if we recognize that people have a right not to be
convicted of crimes of which they are innocent, does it follow that people have a right to the
most accurate procedures possible to prove their guilt or innocence, no matter how expensive
these procedures might be? See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72–73
(1985) (suggesting “no” as an answer to that question); HO HOCK LAI, A PHILOSOPHY OF
EVIDENCE LAW: JUSTICE IN THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH 67–68 (2008) (suggesting the same).
56
Kaplow, supra note 25, at 309 (“If I contemplate committing an act that is unusually
harmful, I will be more careful or more likely to refrain from the act if I will be held
responsible for the true, higher level of harm, rather than for the lower, average level of harm
for the class of acts.”). Accuracy is particularly important when individuals know the actual
level of harm of their actions (or know to what extent some other action affects the magnitude
of the actual harm). If individuals know only the average level of harm associated with the
acts they are planning to commit, but not the actual harm they will cause, then an adjudicative
system that is able to identify more accurately the actual harm seems wasteful as that
information is not available to individuals ex hypothesis, and so cannot influence their
behavior. At the same time, the level of information individuals have about the level of actual
harm of their own behavior is not necessarily given. Accuracy can also influence the degree
to which individuals will decide to spend resources to acquire information about the level of
harm of their activities. Id.
57
18 U.S.C. §§ 1621–23. For interesting discussions about perjury, see Gregory Klass,
Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100 GEO. L.J. 449, 465 n.63 (2012);
Bryan H. Druzin & Jessica Li, The Criminalization of Lying: Under What Circumstances, If
Any, Should Lies Be Made Criminal?, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529, 546–47 (2011);
Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform the
Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157, 174–82 (2001); Richard
H. Underwood, Perjury: An Anthology, 13 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 307, 329–35 (1996);
see generally W. A. Purrington, The Frequency of Perjury, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 67 (arguing
that the courts and the legal profession had been overly lenient toward the crime of perjury)
(1908).
58
See ABF Freight Sys. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 323 (“False testimony in a formal
proceeding is intolerable. We must neither reward nor condone such a ‘flagrant affront’ to
the truth-seeking function of adversary proceedings.”).
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A second example of a substantive rule that potentially influences the accuracy
of legal decisions is the partial defense of provocation in homicide cases. In many
jurisdictions, a person who kills another as a direct response to a legally adequate
act of provocation is guilty of manslaughter rather than murder.59 The provocation
doctrine often has an objective component: it requires that the provocation be an act
or event capable of destabilizing a person of ordinary temperament.60 The problem
is that a subjective standard can be more complex and, therefore, require substantial
fact-finding expenditures and increase the risk of introducing biases and
prejudices.61 Moreover, since evidence about a person’s subjective state of mind is
easy to fabricate and difficult to refute, we should expect that defendants in murder
cases would raise it indiscriminately. Because the necessary evidence to refute such
a defense would be in possession of the defendants, it would be difficult for factfinders to identify cases in which the defense was appropriately used. This can carry
high costs in terms of accuracy.62
B. Reducing Litigation Costs
Although valuable, accuracy is not free or cheap.63 Reducing unnecessary
litigation costs is an important goal of evidentiary and procedural laws.64 Federal
Rule of Evidence 102 recognizes this by stating that the rules “should be construed
59

Mitchell N. Berman & Ian P. Farrell, Provocation Manslaughter as Partial
Justification and Partial Excuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1027, 1031 (2011).
60
Id. at 1043.
61
See STEIN, supra note 10, at 3–4 (“[The objective requirement of the partial defense
of provocation] advances evidential objectives rather than the goals of substantive criminal
law, such as deterrence, desert, and retribution.”).
62
Reasonableness standards are also an element of many tort defenses. James A.
Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 906–07 (1982) (noting
that in order for liability rules to support adjudicatory proceedings, “the rules must require
that the relevant facts are likely to be verifiable by objective evidence, and that the issues for
decision be arranged so that they may be addressed, considered, and decided in an orderly
sequence”). For an alternative view of defenses in torts cases, see generally John C.P.
Goldberg, Inexcusable Wrongs, 103 CAL. L. REV. 467 (explaining how tort law can refuse to
recognize excuses) (2015).
63
Estimating the costs of litigation is complex and challenging. The National Center
for State Courts developed a model that relies on the amount of time expended by attorneys
in various litigation tasks in a variety of civil cases filed in state courts. Paula HannafordAgor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, 20 CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS
1 (2013). For instance, the model estimated that a typical automobile tort case in 2013
resolved shortly after case initiation costs less than $1,000 at the 25th percentile to $7,350 at
the 75th percentile per side for attorney fees. Id. at 5. If the case settles after discovery is
complete, the costs increase from $5,000 to $36,000 in attorney fees. Id. If the case goes to
trial, the total costs, including expert witness fees, can range from $18,000 to $109,000 per
side. Id. These numbers show how litigation costs might affect a litigant’s access to the civil
justice system.
64
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 24, at 1484; Kaplow, supra note 25, at 307–08.
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so as to . . . eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay . . . .”65 Consider the parol
evidence rule, according to which an oral testimony contrary to a written, fullyintegrated contract is generally inadmissible.66 At first, one might assume the
evidentiary purpose of this rule is to increase accuracy. This would only make sense,
however, if we expected that most witnesses testifying against written agreements
are lying, an empirically questionable assumption. The parol evidence rule is better
understood as an attempt to contain litigation costs. Inducing contracting parties to
better document their agreements makes the court’s task less demanding if a dispute
arises.
Litigation costs are not only a function of evidentiary laws, however.
Substantive law also influences the cost of our adjudicatory system. Copyright law
presents two interesting and surprising examples of substantive rules with important
effects on litigation costs.67 Consider, for instance, the creativity requirement, also
referred to as the originality requirement.68 To be eligible for copyright protection,
“a work must be original to the author,” which means that the work must possess “at
least some minimal degree of creativity.”69 Examples of works that lack creativity
and thus have been denied protection include phonebooks70 and recipe books.71 One
explanation proposed for why an intellectual property regime would deny protection
to uncreative work is that creativity correlates with value, so uncreative works would
not be sufficiently valuable to merit protection.72 But this explanation is not entirely
satisfactory. Many uncreative works, such as phonebooks, are arguably valuable.
Moreover, having value is not a requirement for copyright. Market forces ultimately
determine a work’s value. A work might have zero market value but still be entitled
to copyright protection.

65
FED. R. EVID. 102. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also voice that concern.
FED. R. CIV. P. 1 establishes that “[t]hese rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and
proceedings . . . [and] should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the
parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.”
66
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-202. (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
67
See generally Lichtman, supra note 9 (discussing, in part, copyright doctrines and
the idea that social costs of litigation outweigh the social benefits of offering copyright
protection).
68
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this
title, in original works of authorship . . . .”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (a work of authorship must possess “some minimal degree of
creativity” to sustain a copyright claim).
69
Feist, 499 U.S. at 362.
70
See id. at 362 (holding that white pages are not entitled to copyright as they are
“devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity”).
71
See Publ’ns Int’l., Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that recipes do not merit copyright protection because they “do not contain even
a bare modicum of” creativity).
72
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 45–46 (1967); MARSHALL
A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 58 (5th ed. 2010).
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An alternative explanation, among possible others, for why our legal system
requires works to be creative to receive copyright protection is that uncreative works
introduce serious evidentiary problems.73 Infringement disputes would be costly if
uncreative works were copyrightable.74 In a case between parties with similar
uncreative works, it would be difficult to determine whether one party copied the
other, or both copied a third party, or whether similarities between their works are
due simply to the lack of a creative element. Suppose A copyrights work X, and the
copyright expires in 2025. In 2026, A copyrights work Y, which is virtually
indistinguishable from X. In 2030, B creates work Z, which is indistinguishable from
both X and Y. If A sues B, claiming that B infringed A’s copyright on Y, and B
replies that he was copying X (on which copyright had expired) rather than Y, how
could a fact-finder decide which was true?75 Or imagine we instructed several people
to create a list of all Indian restaurants in Boston.76 They would likely create
essentially the same list, even without copying from each other. A creativity
requirement prevents highly costly cases from entering (or at least progressing in)
our administrative and court systems.
Likewise, the copyright requirement that a work must be fixed in any “tangible
medium of expression,”77 such as a manuscript, video, or computer file, can also be,
at least partially, explained by its effects on litigation costs. The relevant statute
defines eligible forms of fixation as “any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”78
The medium does not need to be completely permanent. It needs only to be
“sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”79 Works that
may not satisfy the fixation requirement include any improvisational speech, sketch,
dance, or other performance that is not recorded in a tangible medium of
expression.80 One plausible explanation for this requirement is that an “unfixed
work” would create serious proof problems, substantially increasing the costs of
copyright ligation.81 A fixation requirement excludes cases where there never was
73

Lichtman, supra note 9, at 704–05.
Id. at 705; Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics
Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57, 69–70 (2005) [hereinafter Posner, Intellectual Property]
(making the same point in connection with the requirement that derivative works have some
incremental originality).
75
Posner, Intellectual Property, supra note 74, at 69–70.
76
Lichtman, supra note 9, at 705.
77
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
78
Id.
79
Id. § 101 (defining “fixed”).
80
Leslie Erin Wallis, The Different Art: Choreography and Copyright, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 1442, 1455–56 (1986).
81
Lichtman, supra note 9, at 730; see also Russ VerSteeg, Jurimetric Copyright: Future
Shock for the Visual Arts, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 132 (1994) (“One of the most
74
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any physical evidence of the claimed expression.82 Without a fixation requirement,
expressions and ideas would be virtually indistinguishable.
C. Affecting the Distribution of Errors
The prohibitive costs of a legal system with perfect accuracy mean that we
should expect to make factual adjudication errors. As we cannot eliminate all errors,
we must decide which ones we are willing to accept and which we consider worth
spending additional resources to avoid. This brings us to the focus of this Article and
the third example of an evidentiary policy goal: the distribution of the risk of factual
errors between plaintiffs or prosecutors and defendants.
1. The Error-Distribution Function of Standards of Proof
Standards of proof stand out as a particularly important evidentiary device that
embodies social decisions about the optimal error distribution.83 One way to
visualize the error-distribution function of standards of proof is with graphs like
Figure 1, depicted below.84 But first, a caveat. This framework is admittedly not
meant to reflect a complete picture of any legal system. Instead, the abstract
scenarios are intended to make a series of analytical claims clear. Noticeably missing

important reasons for requiring fixation . . . as a condition precedent to copyright protection
is to ensure that a copyright claimant will be able to provide a court documentary evidence
. . . .”); Gregory S. Donat, Fixing Fixation: A Copyright with Teeth for Improvisational
Performers, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1367–75 (1997).
82
The fixation requirement does not exclude cases where evidence existed at some
point but it is not available at litigation. Lichtman, supra note 9, at 732–33.
83
See sources cited supra note 11; see also LAUDAN, supra note 10, ch. 2, 3; STEIN,
supra note 10, at 138 (“[E]vidential rules and principles affiliating to [the U.S.] have a single
all-important function: allocation of the risk of error.”); MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN,
QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW 62–69 (1978); Michael E. Tigar, The Supreme Court:
1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 158 n.13 (1970) (“[T]he reasonable doubt standard seeks to
assure that erroneous acquittals of the guilty will be far more common than the erroneous
convictions of the innocent.”); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1380–81 n.162 (1971) (“[A] demanding
burden of proof is imposed on the prosecution in order to assure that men are wrongly
convicted much less often than they are wrongly acquitted.”). For an in-depth discussion of
objections to this account of standards of proof, see generally Ribeiro, supra note 11.
84
For other works using similar graphs to represent the error-distribution function of
standards of proof, see LAUDAN, supra note 10, at 67–69; Allen, supra note 10, at 204–06;
Richard S. Bell, Decision Theory and Due Process: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s
Lawmaking for Burdens of Proof, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 570–74 (1987);
Michael L. Dekay, The Difference Between Blackstone‐Like Error Ratios and Probabilistic
Standards of Proof, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 95, 101 (1996).
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from this initial picture are traces of racial and other forms of prejudice against
minorities that shape much of the American legal system. Part II.C.iii below
mitigates this issue by incorporating certain racial disparities that permeate the
United States’ criminal justice system.85

The x-axis (horizontal axis) represents a range of the apparent likelihood of
guilt fact-finders (judges or jurors) assigned to cases. At one end, we have cases with
very weak evidence. These cases might involve acts done by a single individual in
private settings with few externalities and low probability of detection. At the other
end are cases with very strong evidence against defendants, such as acts committed
in public settings with a high number of witnesses, externalities, and detection rates.
Along the y-axis (vertical axis) is the relative frequency of cases for each level of
apparent guilt.
Two distributions are key here: “truly innocent” and “truly guilty” defendants.86
Absent a highly dysfunctional legal system, we should expect that truly guilty
defendants will, on average, have higher apparent guilt than truly innocent
defendants. Consequently, the distribution of truly guilty defendants is represented
85

See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
Some might object to the use of the terms “guilty” and “innocent.” Under one view,
“guilty” and “innocent” represent labels that are only appropriately used at the end of a legal
process. See, e.g., Zenon Bankowski, The Value of Truth: Fact Scepticism Revisited, 1
LEGAL STUD. 257, 265 (1981). The terms “guilty” and “innocent” are employed in the
relevant literature to refer to individuals who committed the violations they are being accused
of and those who did not, respectively. See, e.g., LAUDAN, supra note 10 (examining the
rules of evidence and procedure in relation to truth). This Article kept those terms to avoid
confusion for readers familiar with the relevant literature. One could easily change the names
of both curves without harm to the conclusions that follow.
86
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to the right of the truly innocent distribution on the horizontal spectrum.87 Although
both distributions are depicted as normal curves, normality is not an essential feature
of this analysis. Other unimodal distributions can yield similar results.88 Note also
that both distributions are represented as overlapping. This overlap exists because
there is significant variability within each distribution in terms of apparent guilt.89
Some truly innocent defendants have higher apparent guilt than some truly guilty
defendants.
We can represent a standard of proof by drawing a line perpendicular to the
horizontal axis. That line marks how strongly the admitted evidence supporting a
conclusion about liability must be to justify a finding of liability. More specifically,
this line shows how strongly the admitted evidence supporting the party carrying the
burden of persuasion needs to be. Figure 2 represents one possibility.

The visual appeal of this mode of representation is that the areas under the
curves represent the probabilities of each possible outcome. The area under the Truly
Guilty curve to the right of the standard line represents the probability that a truly
guilty individual will be convicted. The area under the Truly Guilty curve to the left
of the standard (the small blue area in Figure 2) indicates the probability of a truly
guilty individual being mistakenly acquitted (also referred to as a “Type II Error” or
a false negative). Conversely, the probability that a truly innocent individual is
mistakenly convicted is given by the larger red area under the Truly Innocent curve
87

DeKay, supra note 84, at 102.
The two distributions can also be understood as conditional distributions reflecting
the likely values of apparent guilt given that the defendant is truly innocent or given that the
defendant is truly guilty. Id. at 102–03.
89
Id.
88
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to the right of the standard line (also referred to as a “Type I Error” or a false
positive). For values to the left of that point, the individual is correctly acquitted.
Presumably, we want to reduce the likelihood that a truly innocent individual
is mistakenly found liable. Holding other features of the legal system constant (e.g.,
the level of enforcement and the mean and standard deviation of each distribution),
we can try to achieve that goal by increasing the minimal level of evidential support
required for a liability determination. That is, we can increase the standard of proof
necessary for conviction. Graphically, this means moving the perpendicular line in
Figure 2 further to the right, as Figure 3 below illustrates.

The area under the Truly Innocent curve to the right of the standard line (red
area) is smaller, which means a reduced probability of truly innocent defendants
being mistakenly found liable. However, this also reduces the likelihood of correctly
assigning liability for a truly guilty individual. In other words, when determining the
optimal standard, decisionmakers will trade off the number of false positives for
false negatives.90 This trade-off is partially the result of a significant variability
within each group. Some truly innocent defendants may appear guiltier than some
truly guilty defendants (visually represented by the overlap of the two curves). The
higher the likelihood we will correctly assign liability to truly guilty individuals, the
higher the likelihood we will mistakenly assign liability to truly innocent
individuals. On the flip side, lowering the standard of proof (moving the line in
90
This conclusion does not take into consideration an expected level of endogeneity.
That is, the number of innocents and guilty individuals that go to trial seems to be a function
of, among other things, the level of the standard of proof itself. With a higher standard of
proof, conviction becomes more difficult, which lowers the expected costs of sanction for
individuals.
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Figure 2 or 3 to the left) increases the likelihood that fact-finders will correctly
convict truly guilty individuals while simultaneously increasing the likelihood that
truly innocent individuals will mistakenly be found liable. Either way, there is a
trade-off.
Suppose we value one type of error over the other. Why not set up the standard
at the highest level possible to eliminate virtually the chances of convicting an
innocent person? The main problem with this proposal is that it ignores the fact that
both types of errors have costs.91 If the standard is too high, we make it nearly
impossible to convict the truly innocent, but we risk doing the same for the truly
guilty. That has nontrivial consequences, which include losses in deterrence. A
reduction in deterrence can potentially cause crime rates to increase. Moreover, a
loss in deterrence leads to less confidence that justice has been served since a wrong
committed is not remedied, and less trust in the legal system since victims are denied
retribution. The “optimal” error distribution is a function of how society values the
relative costs and benefits of both accurate and erroneous convictions and
acquittals.92
Some scholars, however, are skeptical about our capacity to pursue the
evidentiary policy of successfully distributing the risk of error between parties.93
These authors usually offer two considerations to support their skepticism. First,
they point to the extreme difficulty and the potentially high administrative costs of
acquiring reliable empirical information about all the different factors that affect the
final distribution of the risk of factual error between parties.94 Second, they note our
91

See LARRY LAUDAN, THE LAW’S FLAWS: RETHINKING TRIALS AND ERRORS? 88–105
(2016); see generally Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 65 (2008) (articulating the costs of mistakes other than the conviction of an innocent
person); Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas II: Bail and Crime, 85 CHI.KENT. L. REV. 23 (2010) (discussing costs in the context of bail practices and policies);
Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas III: Some Kind Words for Preventive
Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 781 (2011) (discussing costs and trade-offs in
the context of preventative detention).
92
See, e.g., Dekay, supra note 84, at 99; Tribe, supra note 83, at 1389–93; see generally
Ronald J. Allen, How to Think About Errors, Costs, and Their Allocation, 64 FLA. L. REV.
885 (2012) (discussing societal cost valuation in regard to broader litigation behavior).
93
See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Rationality and the Taming of Complexity, 62 ALA. L.
REV. 1047, 1063–64 (2011) [hereinafter Allen, Taming of Complexity]; see generally KEVIN
M. CLERMONT, STANDARDS OF DECISION IN LAW: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LOGICAL BASES
FOR THE STANDARD OF PROOF, HERE AND ABROAD (2013) (cataloging the variety of
decisionmaking standards that exist in the law); Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence,
Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 557 (2013) (noticing that Stein makes
this a central element of evidence law in STEIN, supra note 10, particularly in chapters 5 and
6).
94
Allen, supra note 10, at 210–12 (arguing that an analysis focused on errordistribution depends on several empirical variables regarding the size and shape of the
curves); Allen & Stein, supra note 93, at 582 (noting that certain proposals “require[]
policymakers to articulate all these categories, along with all other forms of human activity,
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limited capacity to correctly predict the final distribution equilibrium resulting from
the different dynamic effects.95 For those objectors, the problems of insufficient data
and unpredictable effects justify a deep skepticism about our capacity to affect the
error distribution.
Elsewhere, I have offered one possible reply to this line of objection.96 There,
I argued that standards of proof are better understood as prescriptive generalizations,
just like other legal rules.97 Here, this Article only points out that the academic
debunking involved in those objections affects virtually all types of policy analysis
to the same degree. Ultimately, it is premature to dismiss recommendations simply
for lack of “sufficient data.” Surely, any model becomes increasingly dangerous as
it ignores existing data. Absent suitable substitutes, however, models that include
currently unverified (but verifiable) assumptions are helpful starting points.
Most importantly, these starting points need not be spurious assumptions. We
can build them on top of plausible intuitions about a range of empirical phenomena,
including the expected distribution of truly guilty and truly innocent people and the
number of members of each group that goes to trial for a given set of acts. These
intuitions can provide us with prima facie epistemic justification for believing in
those starting points.98 However, we should not remain uncritical. We can (and
should) always periodically pause to re-evaluate our beliefs and practices. If we
notice a significant deviation between our reality and our ambitions, we should make
the appropriate adjustments and move forward. It makes little sense to resort to other
models because they are easier to employ if those substitutes have virtually no
relationship to our objectives. The alternative is unacceptable paralysis.
The influence of standards of proof on the error distribution should not be
overstated, however. Standards of proof, and evidence law more generally, are not
the only forces at play in determining the error distribution.
2. How Substantive Law Affects the Error Distribution
Substantive law can affect the distribution of error between plaintiffs or
prosecutors and defendants by changing the prior allocation of truly guilty and truly

and gather dependable information about the mix of harms and benefits associated with each
category”); see also CLERMONT, supra note 93, at 264–68; but see Kaplow, Burden of Proof,
supra note 30, at 772 n.59 (“[T]he information requirements for determination of the optimal
evidence threshold do not differ greatly from those for the determinants for the
preponderance rule or other rules based on ex-post likelihoods.”).
95
Allen, Taming of Complexity, supra note 93, at 1063–66.
96
Ribeiro, supra note 11, at 207–12.
97
Id.
98
See, e.g., LAURENCE BONJOUR, IN DEFENSE OF PURE REASON: A RATIONALIST
ACCOUNT OF A PRIORI JUSTIFICATION (1998) (defending a rationalist view according to which
a priori rational insights may be genuine, albeit fallible, sources of epistemic justification and
knowledge).
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innocent individuals that go to trial. In other words, substantive law can change how
the Truly Innocent and Truly Guilty curves look in Figures 1–3 above.99
As shown above, substantive laws can affect the accuracy of legal factfinding.100 A more accurate legal system is better able to distinguish between the
factually guilty and the factually innocent. Truly Innocent individuals would have
weaker evidence against them, while Truly Guilty defendants would have stronger
evidence. One way to represent this increase in accuracy graphically is to lower the
mean of the Truly Innocent curve and increase the mean of the Truly Guilty curve,
as shown in Figure 4 below.101

Figure 4

Relative Frequency

Standard of Proof

Truly Innocent

Truly Guilty

Apparent Guilt

Moving the Truly Guilty curve to the right corresponds with a decrease in the
probability of mistaken acquittals. This is represented by the smaller blue striped
area under the Truly Guilty curve to the left of the standard of proof line.
Simultaneously, moving the Truly Innocent curve further to the left causes a
decrease in the probability of mistaken convictions, as shown by the smaller red
striped area under the curve to the right of the standard line. This shift in both curves
changes the corresponding ratio of false acquittals to false convictions (the ratio of

99

See Ronald J. Allen, The Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of
Persuasion in Criminal Cases After Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REV. 30, 47 n.65
(1977) (“Without knowing the distribution of guilt probabilities of factually innocent and
guilty defendants, we cannot know the actual effect of choosing one standard of proof over
another.”). For concrete examples, see FINKELSTEIN, supra note 83 at 62–69.
100
See supra Section III.A.
101
Figure 4 changes the x-value of the means of the Truly Innocent and Truly Guilty
curves while maintaining their y-value and standard deviation.
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the blue striped area to the red striped area).102 The new error distribution is more
protective of defendants.103 For every false conviction, there is a higher number of
false acquittals.
The opposite is also true. Certain legal reforms might have the perhaps
unexpected consequence of reducing the accuracy of our legal system. For example,
some jurisdictions’ drug laws include weight thresholds as a proxy (sometimes
referred to as “indicia of sale”) for police and prosecutors to decide who is a drug
user and who is a dealer.104 If an individual is caught with an amount of a certain
102

Scholars and practitioners alike focus almost exclusively on the ratio between false
acquittals to false convictions (the so-called “Blackstone ratio,” in memory of the influential
British legal theorist who advocated this idea), even though other ratio options are also
possible. LAUDAN, supra note 10, at 68–75 (pointing to problems with this ratio and arguing
in favor of a ratio of true acquittals to false convictions instead); but see Zoë Johnson King,
The Trouble with Standards of Proof (Apr. 15, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (arguing that any ratio is problematic).
103
One way to verify this result is to calculate the approximate probabilities of the
relevant situations (i.e., the color regions) in Figure 4 under certain assumptions. Suppose
the original Truly Innocent curve represents a standard normal distribution with a standard
deviation of one. The Truly Guilty curve has the same standard deviation as the Truly
Innocent curve but a higher mean. Suppose now that the line marking the standard of proof
is two standards deviations from the mean of the Truly Innocent curve and one standard
deviation from the mean of the Truly Guilty curve. The probability of wrong convictions
(WC), the red region in Figure 4, is the area under the Truly Innocent curve greater than two
standards deviations from the mean, or 0.0228. The probability of wrong acquittals (WA),
the blue region in Figure 4, is the area under the Truly Guilty curve that is less than one
standard deviation from the mean, or 0.1587. In this scenario, the ratio of the probabilities of
wrong acquittals to wrong convictions (WA/WC) is, thus, approximately 7. Suppose now
that changes in substantive law caused the Truly Innocent and Truly Guilty curves in Figure
4 to move one standard deviation to the left and the right, respectively. The new probability
of wrong convictions (WC’), the red stripped region in Figure 4, is the area under the Truly
Innocent curve that is greater than 3 standards deviations from the mean, or 0.0013. The new
probability of wrong acquittals (WA’), the blue striped region in Figure 4, is the area under
the Truly Guilty curve that is less than two standard deviations from the mean, or 0.0228. In
this scenario, the ratio of the new probabilities of wrong acquittals to wrong convictions
(WA’/WC’) is, thus, approximately 17.5. That is, the new ratio of wrong acquittals to wrong
convictions (WA’/WC’) is higher than the old ratio (WA/WC). As explained in the main
text, a higher ratio represents an error-distribution that is more protective of defendants. I am
indebted to Professors Louis Kaplow and Sarah Fletcher for their elucidations on this point.
104
For interesting discussions about the evidentiary and sentencing aspects of weight
thresholds for controlled substances, see generally, e.g., Elizabeth McKinley, The
Importance of Drug Quantity in Federal Sentencing: How Circuit Courts Should Determine
the Mandatory Minimum Sentence for Conspiracy to Distribute Controlled Substances in
Light of United States v. Stoddard, 87 U. CIN. L. REV. 1145 (2019) (discussing how courts
must look to the specific controlled substance at issue and the weight of that substance to
determine the penalties for a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)); Leah Moyle, Ross Coomber
& Jason Lowther, Crushing a Walnut with a Sledge Hammer? Analyzing the Penal Response
to the Social Supply of Illicit Drugs, 22 SOC. LEG. STUD. 4 (2013) (criticizing the 2012 UK
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drug that is greater than the threshold, he may be charged with selling- or
distribution-related violations even though there might be no other corroborating
evidence that they intended to sell or distribute the drug.105 The assumption is that
the more of a drug someone possesses, the higher up in the distribution hierarchy
they are, and thus the more deserving of punishment. Mandatory minimum
sentences are based on this assumption, tying long sentences to drug quantity.106
The problem is that these weight thresholds are set with little consideration for
how people purchase and use drugs. Some thresholds are so low that a daily average
dose for a user might be over the limit.107 People living in remote areas may purchase
larger quantities if they only have sporadic access to a seller.108 Groups of
individuals may also purchase larger quantities hoping to save money and minimize
the risk of being caught by engaging in a single transaction rather than a series of
them.109 Likewise, it is often the case that the individuals at the top of the drug
distribution cartel rarely have drugs in their possession.110 Individuals who transport
large quantities are usually lower in the distribution hierarchy but face more severe
penalties.111 In other words, this policy makes it more difficult to accurately
distinguish users from dealers. Figure 5 represents this reduction in accuracy.

Drug Offences Definitive Guideline for using threshold quantities as proxies for the expected
harm caused by drug dealers); Dana R. Hassin, How Much Is Too Much? Rule 704(b)
Opinions on Personal Use vs. Intent to Distribute, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 667 (2001) (arguing
that FRE 704 (b) should apply to police officer testimony as to the connections between drug
quantity and defendant’s presumed intent to distribute); see also DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE,
RETHINKING THE “DRUG DEALER” 29 (2019), www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/dparethinking-the-drug-dealer_0.pdf. [https://perma.cc/7E73-93KE] (calling for weight
thresholds for possession that more accurately reflect the amount of a drug that people who
use drugs could be reasonably expected to possess).
105
DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, supra note 104, at 29 (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-3401,
13-3420). While other jurisdictions may not include weight thresholds in their drug laws,
weight remains one of the primary factors that police and prosecutors use to argue that
someone possessed drugs for sale or distribution rather than personal use. Id. (citing 21
U.S.C. § 841; N.Y. Penal law §220.31).
106
Jane L. Froyd, Safety Valve Failure: Low-Level Drug Offenders and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1471, 1492 (2000).
107
DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, supra note 104, at 29.
108
Id.
109
Id. (citing to Leah Moyle, Ross Coomber & Jason Lowther, Crushing a Walnut with
a Sledge Hammer? Analyzing the Penal Response to the Social Supply of Illicit Drugs, 22
SOC. LEG. STUD. 553, 565 (2013)).
110
Id.
111
Id.
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Figure 5

Relative Frequency

Standard of Proof

Truly Innocent

Truly Guilty

Apparent Guilt

When we move the Truly Guilty curve to the left, closer to the standard of
proof, we notice an increase in the probability of mistaken acquittals. We can see
the larger area occupied by the blue stripes plus the solid blue compared to only the
solid blue area. Likewise, when we move the Truly Innocent curve to the right, we
also see an increase in the probability of mistaken convictions. This is illustrated by
the larger area of red stripes plus solid red relative to only the solid red area. This
shift in both curves also causes a change in the corresponding ratio of the blue area
to the red area (the ratio of false acquittals to false convictions). The new error
distribution is less protective of defendants.112 For every false conviction, there are
fewer false acquittals.
The error distribution is also a function of how substantive law is formulated
and applied. Consider, for instance, the debate between rules and standards.113 In its
112
Like Figure 4, calculating the approximate probabilities of the color regions allows
us to verify the argument. Suppose that changes in substantive law caused the Truly Innocent
and Truly Guilty curves in Figure 5 to move one standard deviation to the right and the left,
respectively. The new probability of wrong convictions (WC’’), the red solid and striped
regions in Figure 5, is the area under the Truly Innocent curve that is greater than one
standard deviation from the mean, or 0.1587. The new probability of wrong acquittals
(WA’’), the blue solid and striped regions in Figure 5, is the area under the Truly Guilty
curve that is less than zero standard deviations from the mean, or 0.5. In this scenario, the
ratio of the new probabilities of wrong acquittals to wrong convictions (WA’’/WC’’) is, thus,
approximately 3. The new ratio of wrong acquittals to wrong convictions (WA’’/WC’’) is
lower than the initial ratio (WA/WC = ~7). As explained in the main text, a lower ratio
represents an error-distribution less protective of defendants.
113
For discussions about rules versus standards, see generally Gideon Parchomovsky
& Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165 (2015); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
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simplest formulation, rules establish a triggering phenomenon and a consequence,
whereas a standard usually defines a set of relevant considerations and options.
Rules are generally thought to allow for better uniformity and certainty while
introducing problems of over- and under-inclusion.114 In contrast, standards are
thought to allow for greater flexibility and individualization while raising the risk of
manipulability and indeterminacy.115 Translating these characteristics to our visual
representations, when standards are used, we should expect a higher standard
deviation along the Truly Guilty and Truly Innocent distributions due to the
increased flexibility and individualization that are traditionally associated with
standards. Figure 6 captures one (but not the only) way to illustrate this scenario and
its effect on the error-distribution.

Figure 6

Relative Frequency

Standard of Proof

Truly Innocent

Truly Guilty

Apparent Guilt

Figure 6 shows an increase in the number of false acquittals, represented by the
difference between the solid blue area and the area with blue stripes plus the solid
blue area. Likewise, the number of false convictions increases, indicated by the
difference between the solid red area and the area with red stripes plus the solid red
area. Interestingly, although we are assuming the effects of the proposed change
affect both curves equally, we still see a change in the ratio between the areas under
the Truly Guilty curve to the left of the standard of proof and that under the Truly
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. REV. 557 (1992); Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Baird & Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the
Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217 (1982); Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
I am indebted to Professor Jeffrey Pojanowski and Edward Cheng for helpful discussions of
this point.
114
See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 113, at 400.
115
Id.
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Innocent curve to the right (i.e., false acquittals to false convictions). The new error
distribution is less protective of defendants.116
Consider, now, the “serious potential risk of physical injury” standard in the
now-defunct residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (“ACCA”).
The ACCA imposes an enhanced sentence to defendants convicted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (felon in possession of a firearm) with three or more prior convictions for
a “violent felony,” a term defined by ACCA’s residual clause to include crimes that
involve “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.”117 In assessing whether a crime met the “serious potential risk of physical
injury” standard, a court needed to ask “whether the conduct encompassed by the
elements of the offense, in the ordinary case, presents a serious potential risk of
injury to another.”118 That is, courts had to consider an idealized ordinary case of the
crime, not how an individual offender acted in a particular situation.119 In explaining
why attempted burglary poses a “serious potential risk of physical injury,” the
Supreme Court said: “[a]n armed would-be burglar may be spotted by a police
officer, a private security guard, or a participant in a neighborhood watch program .
. . and a violent encounter may ensue.”120
As result of the uncertainties with a “serious potential risk of physical injury”
standard, courts differed significantly in their interpretation of which crimes
constituted a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s residual clause. The Supreme
Court’s own precedent makes these disagreements clear. Between 2007 and 2011,
the court held that the ACCA’s residual clause (1) covered Florida’s offense of
attempted burglary;121 (2) did not cover New Mexico’s offense of driving under the
influence;122 (3) did not cover Illinois’ offense of failure to report to a penal

116

As before, the best way to verify this result is by calculating the approximate
probabilities of the color regions. Figure 6 represents an increase in the standard deviation
of both curves. Assuming the standard of proof remains the same as in Figures 4 and 5, it
intersects the new Truly Innocent at a point less than two standard deviations from the mean,
say one and a half standard deviations, and the new Truly Guilty curve at a point less than
one standard deviation from the mean, say half of a standard deviation. The new probability
of wrong convictions (WC’’’), the red solid and striped regions in Figure 6, is the area under
the Truly Innocent curve that is greater than one and a half standard deviations from the
mean, or 0.2266. The new probability of wrong acquittals (WA’’’), the region of the solid
and striped region in Figure 6, is the area under the Truly Guilty curve that is less than half
the standard deviation from the mean or 0.6915. In this scenario, the ratio of the new
probabilities of wrong acquittals to wrong convictions (WA’’’/WC’’’) is, thus,
approximately 3. The new ratio is lower than the initial ratio (WA/WC = ~7). A lower ratio
represents an error-distribution less protective of defendants.
117
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).
118
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007) (emphasis added).
119
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142 (2008).
120
James, 550 U.S. at 211.
121
Id. at 209.
122
Begay, 553 U.S. at 142.
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institution;123 and (4) covered Indiana’s offense of vehicular flight from a law
enforcement officer.124
After almost a decade of trying to clarify the “serious potential risk of physical
injury” standard, the United States Supreme Court held in Johnson v. United States
that the ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process
Clause.125 Writing for an 8–1 majority, Justice Scalia reasoned that the judicial
assessment of risk to a judicially imagined “ordinary case” of a crime left grave
uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by the crime and how much risk
was necessary for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.126 Taken together, these
uncertainties produced more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process
Clause tolerates.127
Once the ACCA’s residual clause was declared unconstitutional, all that is left
were the bright-line rules defining “violent felony” as any crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that “(i) has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, [or] involves use of explosives[.]”128 Within our
123

Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 130 (2009).
Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 13 (2011).
125
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 604 (2015) (“Because the elements
necessary to determine the imaginary ideal are uncertain both in nature and degree of effect,
this abstract inquiry offers significantly less predictability than one that deals with the actual,
not with an imaginary condition other than the facts.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also
Rachel E. Barkow, Categorical Mistakes: The Flawed Framework of the Armed Career
Criminal Act and Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 133 HARV. L. REV. 200, 202 (2019).
126
Johnson, 576 U.S. at 597–98 (“How does one go about deciding what kind of
conduct the ‘ordinary case’ of a crime involves? ‘A statistical analysis of the state reporter?
A survey? Expert evidence? Google? Gut instinct?’”) (citing United States v. Mayer, 560
F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2009)).
127
Constitutional challenges quickly followed regarding the similarly worded residual
clause in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 189 F. Supp.
3d 290 (D. Mass. 2016); United States v. Flannery, 230 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D.R.I. 2017); Tosi
v. United States, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127760 (D. Me. 2016); Carmona v. United States,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95212 (D.N.H. 2016). The Supreme Court in Beckles v. United
States, 137 S.Ct. 886, 890 (2017), however, declined to extend the vagueness challenges to
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. More recently, the court struck down similar risk-based
criminal statutes in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1215 (2018) (holding the definition
of “aggravated felony” in the Immigration and Nationality Act was impermissibly vague)
and U.S. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2339 (2019) (holding the residual clause in a federal
statute providing mandatory minimum sentences based on firearm possessing was
unconstitutionally vague). Another controversy that followed Johnson was whether
defendants who had their sentences enhanced pursuant the ACCA’s residual clause could be
resentenced. At issue was whether the rule announced in Johnson was “substantive” or
“procedural.” In Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016), the Supreme Court
held that the rule was substantive and, therefore, retroactive.
128
Johnson, 576 U.S. at 606 (“Today’s decision does not call into question application
of the Act to the four enumerated offenses, or the remainder of the Act’s definition of a
violent felony.”).
124
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framework, when rules, instead of standards, are used we should expect cases to be
clustered more closely around the mean of the Truly Guilty and Truly Innocent
distributions given the higher degree of uniformity and certainty associated with
rules. This can be represented by reducing the standard deviation of both curves, as
illustrated below.

Figure 7

Relative Frequency

Standard of Proof

Truly Innocent

Truly Guilty

Apparent Guilt

Reducing the standard deviation of the Truly Guilty distribution corresponds
with a decrease in the area under this curve to the left of the standard of proof line.
This is visually represented in Figure 7 by the difference between the area with blue
stripes and the area with solid blue plus the blue stripes area. The reduced standard
deviation of the Truly Innocent distribution also translates into a decrease in the area
representing false convictions, as shown above by the difference between the area
with red stripes and the area with solid red plus the red stripes area. Similar to the
situation depicted in Figure 6, although the change affects both curves equally, it
still yields a new error distribution. But, here, the new error distribution is more
protective of defendants.129
129

Figure 7 represents a decrease in the standard deviations of both curves. Assuming
the standard of proof remains the same as in Figures 4-6, it intersects the new Truly Innocent
at a point more than two standard deviations from the mean, say two and a half standard
deviations, and the new Truly Guilty curve at a point more than one standard deviation from
the mean, say one and a half of a standard deviation. The new probability of wrong
convictions (WC’’’’), the red striped region in Figure 7, is the area under the Truly Innocent
curve that is greater than three and a half standard deviations from the mean, or 0.0062. The
new probability of wrong acquittals (WA’’’’), the blue striped region in Figure 7, is the area
under the Truly Guilty curve that is less than one and a half standard deviations from the
mean, or 0.0668. In this scenario, the ratio of the new probabilities of wrong acquittals to

472

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

3. The Racially Disparate Effects on the Error-Distribution
Figures 1–7 represent abstract scenarios intended to make a series of analytical
points clear. Notably missing from the foregoing discussion are explicit and implicit
disparities that permeate the legal system and target different racial groups
disproportionally.130 Racial inequalities are pervasive in the criminal justice system.
Although Blacks make up only 13% of the United States population, they account
for 40% of the imprisoned population.131 Blacks are five times more likely than
Whites to be incarcerated.132 This rate is substantially higher than other minority
groups. Latinos, for instance, are “only” 65% more likely to be incarcerated than
Whites.133 Research has uncovered and explored evidence of racial inequalities in

wrong convictions (WA’’’’/WC’’’’) is, thus, approximately 11. The new ratio is higher than
the initial ratio (WA/WC = ~7). A higher ratio represents an error-distribution more
protective of defendants.
130
For seminal works, see generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW
(1997) (emphasizing the important role race plays in the administration of justice system);
CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF COLOR (1993) (discussing the
racially disparate impact of all-white juries); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE
WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) (arguing that racism is a permanent feature of
American society); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (2006) (exploring how race
shaped the “tough on crime” narrative and policies); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM
CROW (2010) (arguing that the mass incarceration of Blacks has led to the same societal roots
and consequences as in the Reconstruction Era); ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON
POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME : THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA
(2016) (arguing that Johnson’s war on poverty laid the foundation for the mass incarceration
during the Nixon and Reagan administrations); NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK
COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT (2016)
(describing in great detail how implicit bias as to race shapes criminal court in one Illinois
county).
131
Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html
[https://perma.cc/9AGM-CJGS]. Several explanations have been proposed for racial
disparities in the criminal justice system, including income levels, access to quality counsel,
and jurors’ racial bias. See Amanda Agan, Matthew Freedman & Emily Owens, Is Your
Lawyer a Lemon? Incentives and Selection in the Public Provision of Criminal Defense
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24579, 2018); James M. Anderson & Paul
Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on
Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154 (2012); Tara L. Mitchell & Christian A.
Meissner, Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic Review of
Defendant Treatment, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 621 (2005).
132
Black Disparities in Youth Incarceration, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 1 (Sept. 12,
2017),
www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Black-Disparities-inYouth-Incarceration.pdf [https://perma.cc/PG76-BJVH].
133
Latino Disparities in Youth Incarceration, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Oct. 2017),
www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Latino-Disparities-in-YouthIncarceration.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ2U-NQ9F].
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policing,134 charging,135 bail,136 plea bargaining,137 sentencing,138 and, relevant for
our purposes, guilt determination.139
There are multiple ways we can represent these profound racial disparities
within this Article’s framework. Figure 8 below uses a left-skewed distributions
(i.e., with the mean to the left of its median and mode) to represent the harsher guilt
determination of which Black defendants are often the target. Figure 9, in turn, uses
right-skewed distributions (i.e., with the mean to the right of its median and mode)
to illustrate how White defendants are persistently perceived more leniently.

134
See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop
and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397 (2017); CHARLES R.
EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY, & DONALD HAIDER-MARKEL, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE
STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP (2014).
135
See, e.g., Kenneth B. Nunn, The “Darden Dilemma”: Should African Americans
Prosecute Crimes?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473 (2000); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L.
Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 587
(1985).
136
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in
Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L. REV. 987 (1994) (finding thirty-five percent higher bail amounts
for Black defendants).
137
See, e.g., Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the
Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420 (2008); Marc L. Miller, Domination &
Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211 (2004).
138
See, e.g., Crystal S. Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities
in Federal Sentencing, 44 J. LEG. STUD. 75 (2015); David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and
Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON.
285 (2001); David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman & Neil Alan Weiner,
Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and
Legal Overview with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998).
139
See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Mark Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana
Dasgupta, David Faigman, Rachel Godsil, Anthony G. Greenwald, Justin Levinson &
Jennifer Mnookin, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012); Justin D.
Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and
Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307 (2010) (suggesting that implicit
bias influenced how jurors assessed defendants’ apparent guilt); Justin D. Levinson, Huajian
Cai & Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty-/Not Guilty Implicit
Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187 (2010) (finding that participants showed an
implicit negative attitude toward Blacks and an implicit stereotype between Black and
guilty).
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Importantly, Figures 8 and 9 give us a visual representation of an underexplored
form of racial disparity in our criminal justice system: Black defendants are often
subject to an error distribution that is noticeably less protective than White
defendants. Looking at Figure 8 and comparing the left-skewed distribution to a
normal distribution, we see that the probability of false acquittals (i.e., the blue area
under the Truly Guilty curve to the left of the standard of proof) decreases
significantly, while the probability of false convictions (i.e., the red area under the
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Truly Innocent curve to the right of the standard of proof) increases.140 In other
words, under certain conditions, a left-skewed distribution results in a lower ratio of
false acquittals to every false conviction. A lower ratio represents an errordistribution less protective of defendants. For every false conviction, there are fewer
false acquittals.
Figure 9, in turn, illustrates another form of racial disparity seldom discussed
by legal scholarship: White defendants are often afforded a more protective error
distribution than Black defendants. Comparing the right-skewed distribution to a
normal distribution, we see that false acquittals (i.e., the blue area under the Truly
Guilty curve to the left of the standard of proof) increase, while the probability of
false convictions (i.e., the red area under the Truly Innocent curve to the right of the
standard of proof) decreases. In other words, under certain circumstances, rightskewed distributions can represent a ratio of more false acquittals to every false
conviction. A higher ratio of false acquittals to false convictions in an errordistribution is more protective of defendants. For every false conviction, there are
more false acquittals.
Reforms in substantive law that affect the accuracy of legal fact-finding may
aggravate these disparities in the error distribution between Black and White
defendants.141 Figures 10 and 11 show the disparate racial impacts that legal reforms
that decrease the accuracy of the legal system have on Blacks and Whites.

140
141

For more technical explanations, see supra notes 103 and 112.
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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Figure 10 illustrates a less accurate legal fact-finding apparatus in terms of the
Truly Innocent and Truly Guilty having more similar levels of apparent guilt (i.e.,
their curves are closer together). Like in Figure 8 above, Black defendants are
represented with left-skewed distributions. Once we approach the means of both
curves to reflect a loss in accuracy, we see how the probability of false convictions
(i.e., the red area under the Truly Guilty curve to the left of the standard of proof)
increases comparatively more than the probability of false acquittals (i.e., the blue
area under the Truly Innocent curve to the right of the standard of proof).142 Under
these conditions, Figure 10 shows that a decrease in accuracy can lead to a lower
ratio of false acquittals to false convictions among Black defendants. A lower ratio
of false acquittals to false convictions represents an error-distribution less protective
of defendants.
Turning to Figure 11, we see that, for White defendants, the same decrease in
accuracy leads to the opposite result. After the loss of accuracy is accounted for, we
see how the probability of false convictions (i.e., the red area under the Truly Guilty
curve to the left of the standard of proof) increases comparatively less than the
probability of false acquittals (i.e., the blue area under the Truly Innocent curve to
the right of the standard of proof). This suggests that, under certain conditions, a
decrease in accuracy leads to a higher ratio of false acquittals to false convictions
for right-skewed distributions. A higher ratio of false acquittals to false convictions
in an error-distribution is more protective of defendants. These representations show
how legal reforms that, perhaps unexpectedly, reduce the accuracy of legal factfinding, such as establishing weight thresholds for drug-related offenses as discussed
above, might have very disparate impacts on how errors are distributed for Black
defendants in comparison to White defendants.
142

For more technical explanations, see supra notes 103 and 112.
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These seemingly technical findings have profound practical implications for
individuals’ procedural due process safeguards.143 When discussing the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Supreme Court made clear
that the prosecution must establish every key element of its case beyond a reasonable
doubt.144 Justice Brennan went so far as to say that the standard of proof in criminal
cases plays “a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure.”145
The constitutional requirement of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in
criminal cases is based significantly on the idea that the higher standard of proof is
pivotal to enforce an error distribution strongly eschewed in favor of criminal
defendants.146 This Article has shown several ways in which changes in substantive
law can move us away from what procedural due process requires. Discussion about
substantive law reforms, however, rarely raise this possibility. This omission can
come at high costs for criminal defendants’ procedural due process safeguards,
especially for members of minority groups who might be already unfairly treated
based on societal prejudices and stereotypes.

143

For discussions of procedural due process, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255
(1970); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976); see generally Lawrence Alexander,
The Relationship Between Procedural Due Process and Substantive Constitutional Rights,
39 U. FLA. L. REV. 323 (1987) (arguing that “meaning of procedural due process is
determined by the various substantive constitutional values at stake”); Martin H. Redish &
Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due
Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986) (claiming that a procedural due process promotes
equality); Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process Rights of
Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 482 (1984) (critiquing the
Supreme Court’s development of a positivist due process doctrine).
144
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“Due process commands that no man
shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of . . . convincing the
factfinder of his guilt.”) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958)).
145
Id. at 363.
146
There are different reasons in favor of an error distribution in favor of defendants
having to do with liberty, constraints on State power, confidence of the community in
applications of the criminal law, and others. See, e.g., id. at 364 (“Where one party has at
stake an interest of transcending value—as a criminal defendant his liberty—this margin of
error [in fact-finding] is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the
burden of . . . persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.”) (quoting Speiser, 357 U.S. at 525–26); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 757 (1982) (“Standards of proof, like other ‘procedural due process rules[,] are shaped
by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases,
not the rare exceptions.’”) (quoting Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 344) (alteration and emphasis in
original); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489 (1980) (noting that “[o]nce a state has granted
prisoners a liberty interest, we held that due process protections are necessary ‘to insure that
the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated’”) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 557 (1974)).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Changes in substantive law can move away from a defendant-friendly error
distribution, with potentially high costs for defendants’ procedural due process and
other safeguards, especially for minorities. This approach is very different from the
one we employ today. Currently, the potential effects that changes in substantive
laws might cause in the error distribution in a particular area of law or type of case
virtually always go unnoticed. When discussing legal reforms, lawmakers rarely, if
ever, explicitly weigh the consequences for evidentiary policies in general and the
error-distribution in particular. This Article shows how such omissions are
dangerous. Just like decisions about “procedure” can be disguised as Trojan horses
for changing individuals’ substantive rights, so too can decisions about “substance”
unnoticeably affect defendants’ procedural due process safeguards. We should
always be aware of unexpected ways a legal change might influence our legal and
constitutional landscape. This is cause for both optimism and caution as new policy
tools become available. We can pursue evidentiary policies through many different
means.

